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THE MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHIMENT CLAUSE
A DEBATE
(Editor's N~ote: The participants in this discussion are Dr. Leo Pfeffer,
Associate General Counsel of the American Jewish Congress, and Prof. James
M. O'Neill, the prominent author and lecturer. In the interest of a defined
controversy, Drs. Pfeffer and O'Neill have agreed upon the following resolu-
tion: Resolved, that the First Amendment, interpreted in the light of its his-
tory, forbids non-preferential governmental assistance to religion.)
NO LAW RESPECTING AN ESTABLISHMENT
OF RELIGION*
Lx~o PPBFFEB
At the outbreak of the Revolutionary War it was illegal to
celebrate the mass in public in any of the American colonies other
than Pennsylvania." In Virginia a Christian who denied the
Trinity was punishable with imprisonment for three years and
could be adjudged an unfit custodian of his own children. 2 Baptists
were frequently whipped, beaten, arrested, fined and imprisoned,
sometimes on bread and water.' James Madison, complaining to
!a friend about "that diabolical, hell-conceived persecution [that]
rages," wrote in 1774 that "there are at this time five or six well-
meaning men in close jail for publishing their statements, which
in the main are very orthodox," but varied somewhat from the
accepted doctrines of the established Anglican Church.4 In one
Massachusetts town alone, eighteen dissenters were in jail for
refusing to pay ministerial rates in support of the established
worship.'
In Philadelphia the Continental Congress began its operations
by adopting a resolution calling for prayer at the opening of each
daily session, and designating an Episcopalian clergyman to act
as its chaplain. The proclamations and other state papers of the
Congress were not only replete with references to religion, but
unabashedly expressed adherence to Protestantism. The Congress
continually invoked as sanction for its acts, the name of "God,"
"Almighty God," "Nature's God," "God of Armies," "Lord of
Hosts," "His Goodness," "God's Superintending Providence,"
"Great Governor of the World," "Jesus Christ," "Holy Ghost,"
• This article is based in large part on a chapter in Dr. Pfeffer's forthcoming book,
Church, State and Freedom, to be published by Beacon Press.
1. GREENE, RELIGION AND THE STATE 58.
2. JEFFERSON, Notes on Virginia, in BLAu, CORNERsToNE OF REmGIous FREEDoM
77-78.
3. HuHpREY, NATioNxAIsm AND RELIGION IN AmIRcA 368-369.
4. 1 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 18-21 (Hunt ed. 1904).
5. MECKLIN, STORY OF AmERICAN DISSENT 202.
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"Free Protestant Colonies," and many other similar expressions
of devout Protestantism. The legislative acts of the Congress
manifested the same acceptance of a union between the govern-
ment and the Protestant religion. The Congress did not hesitate
to legislate upon such subjects as morality, sin, repentance,
humiliation, divine service, fasting, prayer, reformation, mourn-
ing, public worship, funerals, chaplains, true religion and thanks-
giving8
Barely a dozen years later, Virginia defeated a bill which
would have required all to .contribute to the support of some
religion or, in lieu thereof, to education, and instead enacted a
measure which sought forever to secure the "natural right" that
''no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious
worship, place or ministry whatsoever. ' 7  The Constitutional
Convention of 1787 met for four months without the recitation
of a prayer. After the Convention had been in session for a
month, the octogenarian Franklin, who in earlier years had been
a Deist, moved "that henceforth prayers imploring the assistance
of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held in this
Assembly every morning before we proceed to business, and that
one or more of the Clergy of this City be requested to officiate in
that service." The motion was received politely though not with-
out embarrassment. According to the records of the Convention,
"after several unsuccessful attempts for silently postponing the
matter by adjourning, the adjournment was at length carried,
without any vote on the motion." 8 And the last substantive words
of the Constitution promulgated by the Convention were the man-
date that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification
to any office or public trust under the United States.'' 9
This change in the conception of the relationship of religion
to government was so rapid that it can fairly be called revolu-
tionary. In Virginia, the revolution culminated in 1786 with the
enactment of Jefferson's Statute for Establishing Religious Free-
dom. In some states it took longer; Massachusetts retained a
vestige of establishment until 1832. But by 1791, when the majes-
tic words of the First Amendment-"Congress shall make no law
respecting. an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof' '-were added to the Constitution, the outcome
and meaning of the revolution were clear. -The intent of that
amendment, therefore, must be interpreted not only in the light
6. HumPHREY, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 407-427.
7. BLAU, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 74.
8. 1 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 450-452; MADISON,
JoURNAL oF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 259-261 (Scott ed.)
9. U. S. CONST. Art. VI.
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of that revolution but with the realization that it represented the
formalization of the culmination of that revolution, and was not
merely a preliminary or intermediate step therein.
The product of the revolution was an experiment, unique in
the history of civilization. This experiment rested upon the prin-
ciple-implicit in the Constitution of 1787 and explicit in the
Amendment of 1791-that government has no power to legislate in
the domain of religion, either by restricting its free exercise or
providing for its support. The launching of the American experi-
ment cannot be attributed to any single event or cause. Practical
considerations were undoubtedly of vital significance. These in-
cluded the enactment in 1689 of the English Act of Toleration
which conferred freedom of worship upon dissenting Protestants
and which influenced colonial policy in America, 0 the rise of com-
merce," the exigencies of the Revolutionary War requiring co-
operation of dissenters and Catholics,'2 and, above all, the large
variety of religious sects which settled along the Atlantic sea-
coast.38 Voltaire recognized that: "If there were one religion in
England, its despotism would be terrible; if there were only two,
they would destroy each other; but there are thirty, and therefore
they live in peace and happiness."'" To this Madison added:
"Security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious
rights; it consists in the one case in a multiplicity of interests and
in the other in a multiplicity of sects."1 5
Important as these practical considerations were, it would be
a complete misreading of American history if they were to be
considered the sole reason for the American experiment of separa-
tion of religion and government. Ideological considerations were
equally important. The American experiment rests as much on
the social contract as it does upon the mutual suspicions and ri-
valries of Anglicans, Congregationalists and Presbyterians..
Insistence upon the ideological basis of separation is not
merely a matter of academic history; it has real consequence to
our present discussion. If separation is accepted as the necessary
10. MECHLIN, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 51.
11. See request made in London by the lords of ti-ade to the president of the council
which began: "With regard to the affair of Mr. Davies, a Presbyterian, as Toleration
and a free exercise of religion is so valuable a branch of true liberty and so essential to
the enriching and improving of a Trading Nation, it should ever be held sacred in his
Majesty's Colonies . . ." SwEET, RELIG101 IN CoLm. ALMICA 332.
12. GaRE N, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 76; 1 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 459-461.
13. GREENE, op. Cit. s.upra n. 1 at 64-65; 1 STOES, op. cit. supra n. 12 at 288;
BETH, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAIN POLITICAL THEORY 145 (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, at University of Chicago Library).
14. Quoted in SWEET, op. cit. supra n. 11 at 338.
15. Id. at 339.
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price paid for religious pluralism, 6 it follows that governmental
support of religion is permissible and even desirable if it can be
accomplished in a manner which is fair to all sects.' On the other
hand, if separation is conceived as the lack of power on the part
of government to intervene in religious affairs, support of religion
is violative of the principle of separation even if all sects agree
upon the manner of sharing the state's favors.
This, I submit, is the conceptual foundation of the relation-
ship between church and state instinct in the Constitution and the
First Amendment-the inherent incapacity of political govern-
ment to concern itself with religious matters. With the exception
of a relatively small minority who vainly sought to preserve their
particular moribund establishment, the generation which adopted
the Constitution and the Amendment was committed to the prop-
osition that excluded from the powers delegated to the political
state was any power over religion. The elevation of this proposi-
tion into a constitutional principle which, until recently, has been
held almost sacred by the American people, was the result princi-
pally of two disparate and almost antagonistic forces which vied
for the mind and soul of the new republic-a deeply religious,
evangelical and pietest force led by such devout Christians as
Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield, and a skeptical, anti-
clerical force led by Jefferson and Tom Paine.8 "
These religionists and the rationalists were both motivated
by an uncompromising enmity to establishment, Anglican or Con-
gregationalist; but their ideological meeting place was the prin-
ciple that religion was beyond the delegated jurisdiction of politi-
cal society. They arrived at this meeting place from different di-
rections. To the religionists, the source of all temporal power
was Christ and he had seen fit not to delegate power over religion
to temporal governments. To them, the relationship of state and
church was governed by the text:' "Render unto Caesar the things
which are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's." To
the rationalists, the source of temporal power was the "people in
nature" and they had not seen fit to delegate power over religion
16. See, e. g., OSGINACH, THE CHiuRisTr STATE, quoted in 3 STOKEs, supra n. 12
at 464: "Separation of Church and State is to be tolerated as a lesser evil and because
of necessity owing to the multiplicity of sects and constitutional provisions."
17. See, e. g., Statement of Catholic Bishops, N. Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1948, p. 63:
"It would be an utter distortion of American history and law to make that practical policy
involve the indifference to religion and the exclusion of cooperation between religion and
government implied in the term 'separation of Church and State' as it has become the
shibboleth of doctrinaire secularism."
18. MECKLIx., op. cit. supra n. 5 at 36: "It was the pressure of circumstances that
brought the leaders of the dissenting sects into sympathetic contacts with Paine and
Jefferson. When the battle for religious and national liberty was finally won and the
great principle of separation of church and state was safely embodied in the Constitution,
Paine and Jefferson speedily lost their attraction for the dissenting sects."
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to the governments instituted among men. Their text was the
social contract.
Defense of separation has recently been so often equated with
defense of irreligion, that it is pertinent to cite but a few expres-
sions of the separation principle by deeply religious persons who
were leaders and founders of their churches in America. First in
point of time was, of course, Roger Williams who as much as any-
one else founded the Baptist Church in America. To Williams,
"States ... are proved essentially civil," and the "power of true
discerning the true fear of God" was not one of the powers dele-
gated to civil authority."19
All lawful Magistrates in the World, [said Williams] both
before the coming of Christ Jesus, and since, (excepting those
unparalleled typical Magistrates of the Church of Israel) are but
Derivatives and Agents immediately derived and employed as
eyes and hands, serving for the good of the whole: Hence they
have and can have no more Power, than fundamentally lies in
the Bodies or Fountains themselves, which Power, Mlight, or Au-
thority, is not Religious, Christian, etc. but natural, humane
and civil.20
To the argument that religion needs the aid of government,
Williams answered summarily that " . . . the Scriptures of
Truth and the Records of Time concur in this, that the first
Churches of Christ Jesus, the lights, patterns and precedents to
all succeeding Ages, were gathered and governed without the aid,
assistance, or countenance of any Civil Authority... "'
The Baptists who followed Williams remained faithful to his
tradition. Samuel Stillman, pastor of the First Baptist Church
in Boston, delivered a sermon in 1779 in which he presented the
Baptist view that the "jurisdiction of the magistrate neither can
nor ought to be extended to the salvation of souls.' In 1791,
John Leland, Baptist leader in Virginia, wrote a tract entitled
Rights of Conscience and therefore ReZigious Opinions not cog-
nizable by law, in which he stated that "government has no more
to do with religious opinions of men than it has with the principles
of mathematics." 23
Isaac Backus, representing the Massachusetts Baptists, ar-
gued for the elimination of taxation for religious purposes on the
ground that "The free exercises of private judgment, and the in-
alienable rights of conscience are too high a rank and dignity to
be submitted to the decrees of councils or the imperfect laws of
19. BLAU, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 43.
20. Id. at 48.
21. Id. at 46.
22. HumPHIREY, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 119,.
23. MEcKuN, op. cit. supra n. 5 at 297.
229
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fallible legislators . . . religion is a concern between God and
the soul with which no human authority can intermeddle . . ,,24
Later, he defended the provision in the Federal Constitution pro-
hibiting religious tests on the ground that ". . . nothing is more
evident, both in reason and the Holy Scriptures, than that religion
is ever a matter between God and individuals, and therefore no
man can impose any religious prerogatives of the Lord Jesus
Christ."2225
Though the Baptists were most active and articulate, they
were far from alone among the religionists in preaching and teach-
ing that religion was beyond jurisdiction of the state. It was the
Presbytery of Hanover which remonstrated against the Virginia
Assessment Bill on the ground that:
The end of Civil government is security to the temporal lib-
erty and property of Mankind; and to protect them in the free
Exercise of Religion-Legislators are invested with powers from
their constituents, for these purposes only; and their duty ex-
tends no farther-Religion is altogether personal, and the right
of exercising unalienable; and it is not, cannot, and ought not
to be, resigned to the will of the society at large; and much less
to the Legislature-which derives its authority wholly from the
consent of the people; and is limited to the Original intention
of Civil Associations . 26
The reference to the social contract in this remonstrance
manifested its wide acceptance in the last quarter of the 18th cen-
tury, so widespread, indeed, that it was a "self-evident truth"
to the signers of the Declaration of Independence. This fact and
the influence of Locke are also indicated by the memorial present-
ed by the Baptists to the Continental Congress in 1774:
Men unite in society, according to the great Mfr. Locke, with
an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his lib-
erty and property. The power of the society, or Legislature con-
stituted by them, can never be supposed to extend any further
than the common good, but is obliged to secure to every one's
property. To give laws, to receive obedience, to compel with the
sword, belong to none but the civil magistrate; and on this ground
we affirm that the magistrate's power extends not to the estab-
lishing any articles of faith or forms of worship, by force of
laws; for laws are of no force without penalties. The care of
souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power
consists only in outward force; but pure and saving religion
consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which
nothing can be acceptable to God. 2"
24. HuurH=Y, op. cit. supra r. 3 at 331.
25. Id. at 466.
26. AmEDcAN STATE PAPErs oN Fmou iN RELIGioN 110.
27. HuMpnREY, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 332.
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The concept that religion was outside the ken of political so-
ciety, so warmly espoused by the religionists other than the con-
tinually decreasing minority committed to a particular establish-
ment, was of course at least equally acceptable to the rationalists,
Deists, Unitarians and other non-orthodox. Many of the political
leaders of the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary period had
come under the influence of Deism and not a few were apathetic if
not antagonistic to formal religious worship and institutionalized
religion.28 It is significant that the first four presidents of the
United States were either Deists or Unitarians. But liberalism in
religion was not limited to the leaders; rationalism and skepticism
had made substantial progress among the urban masses. Paine's
Age of Reason was one of the most widely read books of the pe-
riod,29 and not more than one out of eight Americans and probably
as few as one out of every twenty-five was affiliated with any
church.30
It is not too much to say that whatever evidence exists sup-
ports the view that when the Constitutional Convention convened
in Philadelphia in 1787 the overwhelming majority of Americans
accepted the proposition that religion was a personal, non-politi-
cal matter and concurred with Paine's statement in Common
Sense that:
As to religion, I hold it to be the indispensable duty of gov-
ernment to protect all conscientious professors thereof; and I
know of no other business which government hath to do there-
with.$'
It is, therefore, not surprising that whereas almost every docu-
ment or promulgation issued by the Continental Congress invoked
or referred to God .2 or Christ,3 the Constitution emerging from
the Philadelphia convention contained no invocation nor a single
reference to religion other than the negative one in the ban on
religious tests for federal office. Neither the omission nor the
negative reference was inadvertent and neither remained un-
noticed. A delegate to the Connecticut ratifying convention urged
inclusion of "an explicit acknowledgment of the being of God, his
28. 1 BEAD, IZSE OF AMERICAN CVIZATIOx 449.
29. LASKI, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 257.
30. Garrison, History of Anti-Catholicism in America, SOCIAL AcToN, Jan. 15,
1948, p. 9; Moehlman, In Defense of McCollum v. Board of Education, 38 A. B. A. J. 345
(1952). Today at least one out of every two Americans is affiliated with a church.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF RELIGIOUS BODIES 18 (1936); YEARBOOK
OF AMERICAN CHURCHES 239 (1951).
31. 1 W RITINGS OF PAINE 108 (Conway ed.).
32. The short Declaration of Independence contains four references to God.
33. The treaty of peace with Great Britain was proclaimed "In the name of the
most Holy and Undivided Trinity." HuMPHREY, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 430.
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perfections and his providence." 3 4 At a meeting of Congregation-
alists in June, 1788, a request was presented "that some suitable
Testimony might* be borne against the sinful omission in the late
Federal Constitution in not looking to God for direction, and of
omitting the mention of God in the Constitution. 1 And two
Presbyterian church groups resolved not to vote at elections until
the Constitution would be amended to acknowledge the sovereignty
of God and Christ.8
The ban on religious tests likewise aroused opposition among
some religionists. When the issue was raised in the Maryland
legislature, Luther Martin related:
The part of the system which provides that no religious test
shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public
trust under the United States was adopted by a great majority
of the Convention and without much debate: however, there
were some members so unfashionable as to think that a belief in
the existence of a Deity, and of a state of future rewards and
punishments would be some security for the good conduct of our
rulers, and that, in a Christian Country, it would be at least de-
cent to hold out some distinction between the professors of
Christianity and downright infidelity or paganism.37
There appears to have been no doubt as to the reasons for
the ban. In a number of states, the fear was expressed "that the
constitution by prohibiting religious tests, opened a door for
Jews. Turks and infidels,""' and it was urged that if it were felt
inadvisable to require of public officers a belief in Protestantism
or Christianity, at least inquiry should be made if the nominee
"believes in a Supreme Being and in a future state of rewards
and punishments." 3 9 Almost invariably the basic reason given for
the omission was the same. In Connecticut, Oliver Ellsworth,
later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, agreed that "If any
test-act were to be made, perhaps the least exceptionable would
be one requiring all persons appointed to office to declare at the
time of their admission, their belief in the being of God, and in
the divine authority of the Scriptures.". But, Ellsworth replied,
"the business of civil government is to protect the citizen in his
rights, to defend the community from hostile powers, and to pro-
mote the general welfare. Civil government has no business to
meddle with the private opinion of the people." 40
34. Id. at 462.
35. Id. at 463.
36. SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 433..37. 3 FARRAND, REcoRDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 227.
38. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 176 (Hunt ed. 1904).
39. 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 195-198.
40. HUMPHREY, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 463-464.
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In Massachusetts, the Baptist Backus defended the prohibition
on the ground that "nothing is more evident, both in reason and
the Holy Scriptures, that religion is ever a matter between God
and individuals." 4I Even a fellow delegate who was a minister in
the established Congregational Church agreed with the ban on
the ground that "God alone is the God of conscience, and, con-
sequently, attempts to erect human tribunals for the conscience
of men, are improper encroachments upon the prerogatives of
God."142
In North Carolina, it was argued that while it was possible
that the people may "choose representatives who have no re-
ligion at all . . . how is it possible to exclude any set of men,
without taking away that principle of religious freedom which we
ourselves so warmly contend for . . . It would be happy for man-
kind if religion was permitted to take its own course, and main-
tain itself by the excellence of its own doctrines. The divine
Author of our religion never wished for its support by worldly
authority. . . It made greater progress for itself than when sup-
ported by the greatest authority upon earth." 43 To this Governor
Johnston added that "it would have been dangerous if Congress
could intermeddle with the subject of religion."' 44
These expressions manifested a widespread if not universal
assumption that the new national government had no power to
intermeddle with religion in any way, either to hinder it or to
support it. As Madison forcefully put it, the Constitution was not
to create "a shadow of right in the general government to inter-
meddle with religion." '45 Edmund Randolph, addressing the Vir-
ginia ratification convention, declared that "no power is expressly
given to Congress over religion."46  Pinckney of South Carolina
had suggested making the absence of power specific and explicit;
he had proposed a provision in the Constitution that ". . . the
Legislature of the United States shall pass no law on the subject
of religion; nor touching or abridging the liberty of the press;
nor shall the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus ever be
suspended, except in the case of rebellion or invasion. 
47
While none of these express prohibitions was acted upon by
the Convention, there appears little reason to doubt that the
reason was not disagreement with their purpose but a strong
41. 2 ELLioTT, DEBATES 118-119.
42. Id. at 148-149.
43. Op. cit. supra n. 39 at 195-198.
44. Id. at 200.
45. Id. at 122; 5 EUio=ar, DEBATEs 132.
46. Op. cit. supra n. 37 at 310.
47. Id. at 122; 5 ELuaOTT, DEBATES 131.
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belief that they were unnecessary. A provision forbidding Con-
gress from establishing religion or prohibiting its free exercise
was unnecessary because, as Madison said, "The government has
no jurisdiction over" religion." James Wilson argued that "all
is reserved in a general government which is not given," and
that since the power to legislate on religion or the press was not
given to the federal government, the government did not possess
it and there was therefore no need for an express prohibition.
"What part of this system," he queried, "put it in the power of
Congress to attack . . . the rights of conscience? When there is
no power to attack, it is idle to prepare the means of defense.""
Hamilton went further; he argued that a bill of rights not
only was unnecessary but was dangerous as it might create the
inference that a power to deal with the reserved subject was in
fact conferred. Writing in the Federalist he said:
I go further and affirm that bills of rights in the sense and to
the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unneces-
sary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous.
They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted;
and, on the very account, would afford a colorable pretext to
claim more than was granted. For why declare that things
shall not be done which there is no power to do ? 5
The people were not satisfied with these assurances. In the
ratifying convention of almost every state some objection was
expressed to the absence of a restriction upon the Federal govern-
ment with respect to legislation regarding religion.5 ' Jefferson
felt that a bill of rights should not "rest on inferences," and it
was only- because Madison and the other proponents promised to
work for a bill of rights after adoption of the Constitution that
a sufficient number of states were persuaded to ratify it. Accord-
ingly, shortly after his election to the House of Representatives
in 1789, Madison introduced his compilation of proposals for
amendments to the'Constitution to meet the demands for a bill of
rights.
The debates in the House of Representatives on Madison's
proposal respecting religious freedom and the various other pro-
posals on the same subject have been the subject of considerable
discussion. It is largely upon these that the contention that the
First Amendment bars only preferential aid to religion is based.
I have elsewhere set forth the reasons for my belief that these
48. Op. cit. supra n. 38 at 176.
49. 3 ELLIOTT, DEBATES 252.
50. FEDERALIST PAPERS 559 (Modern Library ed.).
51. Kohler, The Fathers of the Republic and Constitutional Establishment ofReligious Liberty, in LuzzATIT, GOD IN FaRaaox, 692-693.
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debates and proposals do not sustain the contention," and it is
not necessary to repeat them. Here it need only be stated that
nothing in the debates surrounding the proposals which finally
culminated in the religion clause of the First Amendment indicates
any intent to abridge a recognized power inherent or previously
conferred and certaiiily not to confer a power previously absent.
As we have seen, it was a widespread belief in 1791, both among
religionists and rationalists, that no political state had the right-
ful power to deal with religion on a preferential or non-preferen-
tial basis. It was universally assumed that the federal govern-
ment, whose jurisdiction was doubly derivative, had no such
power. It was also generally assumed that the purpose of the
First Amendment was to express the absence of that power.53 To
meet the danger warned against by Hamilton, the Ninth54 and
Tenth55 Amendments were added to the Bill of Rights. It would
indeed be an ironic if not cruel joke upon the people if notwith-
standing all these precautions Congress were held to have more
power under the First Amendment than it would have had without
it.
Two abortive attempts were made-whether intentionally or
not cannot be said-to create the "colorable pretext to claim more
than was granted" which Hamilton feared. When the First
Amendment, as adopted in the House, was debated in the Senate,
the following proceedings took place:
The resolve of the House of Representatives . . .was read,
as followetli:
"Art. I. Congress shall make no law establishing religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall the rights of
conscience be infringed."
The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolve of the
House of Representatives on the amendments to the Constitution
of the United States.
52. Church and State: Something Less than Separation, 19 CHL L. R v. 1 (1951).
53. See Bancroft's letter to Schaff:
"Congress from the beginning was as much without the power to make a law
respecting the establishment of religion as it is now that the amendment was passed."
ScHArF, op. cit. supra n. 35 at 137. See also, BEARD, THE REPuBuc 166, 170: "The
Constitution does not confer upon the Federal government any power to deal with reli-
gion in any form or manner . . .The First Amendment merely confirms the intention
of the framers."
54. "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
55. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
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On motion to amend Article the third, and to strike out these
words: "Religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," and
insert 'No religious sect or society in preference to others :"
It passed in the negative.
On motion for reconsideration:
It passed in the affirmative.
On motion that Article the third be stricken out:
It passed in the negative.
On motion to adopt the following, in lieu of the third Article:
"Congress shall not make any law infringing the rights of con-
science, or establishing any religious sect or society :"
It passed in the negative.
On motion to amend the third Article, to read thus:
"Congress shall make no law establishing any particular denomi-
nation or religion in preference to another, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be in-
fringed:"
It passed in the negative.
On the question upon the third Article as it came from the
House of Representatives:
It passed in the negative.
On motion to adopt the third Article proposed in the resolve
of the House of Representatives, amended by striking out these
words, "-To shall the rights of conscience be infringed :"
It passed in the affirmative. 8
It can be seen that the purpose of the proposed changes was
to have the First Amendment read: Congress shall make no law
establishing one Religious Sect or society in preference to others,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, nor shall the rights of
conscience be infringed.
And: Congress shall make no law establishing any particu-
lar denomination or religion in preference to another, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise, thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be
infringed.
If either of these two versions had been adopted, an arguable
contention could be made that by prohibiting only preferential
establishment, non-preferential aid or support was impliedly per-
mitted. However, both versions were rejected and the prohibi-
tion which came out of the joint conference committee and became
the First Amendment was in fact broader in its language than the
version originally adopted by the House; instead of forbidding
56. JoURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE, 63, 67 (Aug. 25, and Sept. 3, 1791).
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only a "law establishing religion," it forbade any law "respect-
ing an establishment of religion."
This language carried with it a prohibition almost unlimited
in scope. It was, in substance, Pinckney's proposed ban on any
law "on the subject of religion," or Charles Livermore's proposed
First Amendment-approved at one time in the liouse--"Con-
gress shall make no law touching religion . .. 1"57 For the term
"establishment of religion" was not used-at least not solely-in
the sense of an "establishing of religion" or in the sense of an
"established" church as we generally understand the term, but
in the sense of a "religious establishment," in the same sense that
a religious law may be called a law of religion or a religious book
may be called a book of religion.
True enough, the Supreme Court in 1899 denied that the
Amendment's phrase "law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion" was synonymous with "law respecting a religious estab-
lishment. ""s But Roger Sherman, in presenting the usual explana-
tion for the omission of a Bill of Rights, argued that it was un-
necessary because "Congress had no authority delegated to them
by the Constitution to make religious establishments. ' ' 19  And
Madison, who more than any other single person was responsible
for the First Amendment, not only considered the terms synony-
mous but on two separate occasions forgetfully quoted the Amend-
ment as using the term "religious establishment." In vetoing, as
President, a bill to incorporate the Episcopal Church in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, he said:
(T)he bill exceeds the rightful authority to which govern-
ments are limited by the essential distinction between civil and
religious functions, and violates in particular the article of the
Constitution: of the United States which declares that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment
.t6 This particular church, therefore, would so far be a
religious establishment by law, a legal force and sanction being
given to certain articles of its Constitution and administration.61
A week later hd vetoed a bill giving'certain land to a Baptist
church because
. the bill in reserving a certain parcel of land of the
United States for the use of said Baptist Church comprises a
57. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 731. Of this proposal Stokes says: "And so the
general form which the religious-freedom guarantee later took in our Federal Bill 6f
Rights was largely due to Samuel Livermore." 1 STOFES, op. cit. supra n. 12 at 317.
58. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899).
59. 1 ANNALS 732.
60. The quotations marks are Msladison's.
61. 1 RICHARDSONT, MESSAGES OF THE PRESMENTS, 489. (Italics added.) Note
that unconstitutionality was not predicated on the ground that the bill was preferential.
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principle and a precedent for the appropriation of funds of the
United States for the use and support of religious societies,02
contrary to the article in the Constitution which declares that
"Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establish-
ment" . . 63
Moreover, the word "establishment" had a broad meaning,
comprehending almost every tangible manifestation of religion-
or at least organized or institutionalized religion. An incorporated
church was a "religious establishment," in Madison's veto mes-
sage. A place where persons worshipped was a "religious estab-
lishment. '" Jefferson considered even a non-sectarian Presi-
dential proclamation of thanksgiving a law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion interdicted by the First Amendment." Madi-
son considered the institutions of Congressional chaplains"0 and
military chaplainsGT as religious establishments.
These instances of the use of the term "establishment"
give strong support for the proposition that the general purpose
and understanding of the First Amendment at the time of its
adoption was that it expressed the federal government's inherent
incapacity to act at all in the field of religion. Of course, in view
of the complexity of human institutions, endeavors and motiva-
tions, complete government non-cognizance of religion is im-
possible practically; but as far as is possible and practical, the
mandate of the First Amendment required the government to be
religion-blind. 8 The Amendment represented in the eyes of the
generation that adopted it the formalization and legal expression
of the uniquely American concept, which, although expressed in
different ways, had by 1791 almost achieved the status of a truism
-the concept that religion was a private matter, a matter which
62. (Italics added.) Note the use of the plural, and again the avoidance of
grounding unconstitutionality on preference.
63. 1 RicHARDsoN, op. cit. supra n. 61 at 490. The quotation marks are Madison's.
64. A proposed regulation of the University of Virginia in 1824 provided that the
students "will be free and expected to attend religious worship at the establishment of
their respected sects." Burrs, AmERICAN TRADITION IN RELIGION AND EDUCATION, 123.
65. 11 JErzasoN's WRMNGS (Monticello ed.) 428-430. Jackson shared this view.
3 STToxs, op. cit. supra n. 12 at 181-183.
66. Fleet, Madison's "Detached Memoranda," 3 W31Lr&1 AND MARY QUARTERLY(1946) p. 559: "The establishment of the chaplainship [to Congress] is a palpable
violation of equal rights, as well as of Constitutional principles . . . Were the establish-
ment to be tried by its fruits, are not the daily devotions . . . already degenerating into
a scanty attendance and a tiresome formality? . . ."
67. Ibid: "Better also to disarm in the same way, the precedent of Chaplainshipsfor the army and navy, than erect them into a political authority in matters of religion;The object of this establishment is seducing; the motive to it is laudable."
68. During the disestablishment period in which the Constitution and First Amend-
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clergymen from political or at least legislative office. Madison opposed the exclusions on
the ground, among others, that it violated the principle "which exempts religion from
the cognizance of Civil power." 5 MADIsoN 288 (Hunt ed.).
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lies solely between man and his God, a matter not -within the scope
or cognizance of political society, etc. To paraphrase Madison:
Since religion is wholly exempt from the cognizance of civil
society, it could not be within the authority of any legislative body
whose jurisdiction is both derivative and linited,69 and therefore
even less could it be within the authority of the Federal govern-
ment whose jurisdiction was itself derived from limited legislative
bodies.
This was the meaning of the First Amendment as understood
by the generation which adopted it, and, with one notable excep-
tion shortly to be mentioned, it was practically the universal ac-
ceptande of its meaning until the recent efforts to restrict its mean-
ing to bar only preferential establishments. A century after the
Amendment was adopted, Lord Bryce testified to the universality
of this interpretation:
It is accepted as an axiom by all Americans that civil power
ought to be not only neutral and impartial as between different
forms of faith, but ought to leave these matters entirely on one
side, regarding them no more than it regards the artistic or
literary pursuits of the citizens. There seem to be no two oin-
ions on this subject in the United States.7
Obviously, under this interpretation of the Amendment Congress
can no more support all sects than it can single out one or more
sects for preferential support.
The incident of the Blaine amendment bears a strong support
for this interpretation. In 1876 Senator Blaine introduced a reso-
lution for a constitutional amendment providing:
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money
raised by taxation in any State for the support of public schools,
or derived from any public fund therefor, nor any public lands
devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious
sect or denomination nor shall any money so raised or lands so
devoted be divided between r'eligious sects or denominations.1
This proposal received a majority in both houses but just fell
short of the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate.
It will be noted, first that the proposed amendment expressly
prohibited non-preferential support; and second, that its applica-
tion was limited to the states. It is difficult to believe that a more
69. MEMoRIAL AwD REmOxSTRAxCE AGAIwST VGnIA AssEssMEXT BIu., first
two paragraphs after introductory paragraph.
70. 2 THE AmmucAN COmmOWZvEA.LTH, 776 (3rd ed. 1894). (Italics added.)
71. 4 CoNG. REc. 5580 (44th Cong., 1876). (Italics added.)
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severe restriction would be imposed upon the states than governed
action by the federal government. The sponsors of the Blaine
amendment did not so construe it. Senator Christancy, arguing
for the amendment, stated that "it is simply imposing on the
States what the Constitution already imposes on the United
States." Equally significant is Senator Frelinghuysen's state-
ment that "the article as amended by the Senate prohibits the
States, for the first time, from the establishment of religion, from
prohibiting its free exercise, and from making any religious test
a qualification to office."1 -72 It thus appears clear that not only was
it believed that the First Amendment barred non-preferential aid
to religion, but also that such aid constituted an "establishment
of religion."
Until 1948, when the appellees in McCollum v. Board of Edu-
cation 3 unsuccessfully called upon the Supreme Court to reject
this broad interpretation of the establishment clause, the only
significant dissent was by Justice Story. Story, though a Uni-
tarian, firmly believed in state support of the Christian religion.
In Massachusetts he had fought to substitute the exclusive Con-
gregationalist establishment with a constitutional provision pro-
viding for the support of all Christian denominations. 4 Unsuc-
cessful there in his attempt to stay the onward course of the
American history of church-state relations, he sought to undo
disestablishment in Virginia by his interpretation of its constitu-
tion that:
Consistently with the constitution of Virginia the legislature
could not create or continue a religious establishment which
should have exclusive rights and prerogatives, or compel the citi-
zens to worship under stipulated form of discipline or to pay
taxes to those whose creed they could not conscientiously believe.
But the free exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be
restrained by aiding with equal attention the votaries of every
sect to perform their own religious duties, or by establishingfunds for the support of ministers, for public charities, for the
endowment of churches, for the sepulture of the dead.7
This Canutian misreading of Virginia's constitution and its
victorious struggle for separation proved equally futile for the
simple reason that the Virginia courts refused to accept it. 6 Un-
daunted, Story tried the same approach to the Federal Constitu-
tion:
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The real object [he wrote] of the [First] Amendment was not
to countenance, much less to advance, Mohametanism, or Juda-
ism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity, but to exclude all
rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any national ec-
clesiastical establishment which should give to a hierarchy the
exclusive patronage of the national government. 7
For more than a century it appeared that Story was no more
successful in his war against complete separation in the federal
government than in Massachusetts and Virginia. Now, however,
his narrow construction of the First Amendment has suddenly
experienced a new revival. True, some compromise had to be
made with the liberalism of our day. It is conceded now-Story to
the contrary notwithstanding-that Judaism is entitled to support
from the government along with Christianity. But this con-
cession vitiates the entire force of Story as authority. For Story
was firm in his conviction that the Constitution sanctions pre-
ferential treatment of Christianity- over other religions, and if
Story was in error to that extent he may have been equally in
error in implying that the sole purpose of the First Amendment
was to prevent a "national ecclesiastical establishment."
Perhaps if our Constitution and the First Amendment had
been framed by the Continential Congress in 1775 it would have
reflected a relationship of church and state comprehending state
support of religion. But, for good or ill, our Constitution was
framed at the conclusion rather than the beginning of the revolu-
tion in church-state relations, and that revolution was reflected
in the principle implicit in the Constitution and explicit in the
First Amendment that religion, preferential or non-preferential,
is completely outside the jurisdiction of the government.
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